


PHILOSOPHY,
RELIGION AND
EDUCATION

CHRISTIANITY and CRISIS

A Christian Journal Of Opinion



China: A Plea For Courage And Light

Current disputing over the visits of American newsmen to China should turn many minds to the basic question of relations with that country. Secretary Dulles' succession of dubious and divergent reasons for refusing to allow passports to correspondents continues to stutter in anomalies and suggests that he is trying to discover by trial and error a plausible justification for an untenable stand. But the Secretary's embarrassment is due less to personal ineptitude than to national fault on the grand scale, in which most of us share.

The fault is a compound of rigidity and timidity. It is understandable that the events of 1945-1952 should set the United States in hostile mood toward Communist China. Spectacular failure of the long effort to maintain a China independent against all comers; the sudden enormous expansion of Moscow-related power on the shores of the Pacific from mid-Korea to Indochina and the borders of Thailand, Burma and India; the prompt acts of the new China against American and other non-Communist interests; Communist invasion of South Korea and its armed support by China against the United Nations; bitter and costly warfare exacerbated by the Chinese mishandling of prisoners in several relationships—all these could not fail to arouse strong resentment and distrust, which some idealists and some European and Asiatic critics are more eager to dismiss than to comprehend.

Given the facts just recalled, and some confusion of mind as to whether the Communists could or would consolidate power over their vast domain, could or would rush on to attempt further conquests; strong commitments to Taiwan and to South Korea, strong intent to defend Japan and the Philippines, strong desire to protect Southeast Asia generally, were natural responses. The edge of defensive rancor was sharpened and hard-

ened by the controversy between the American parties and the apparent political advantage in taking a strong anti-Communist line which, for various interesting reasons, was more readily exploitable in looking toward East Asia than in looking toward Russia and East Europe. In all this, Communist China has been the prime antagonist.

True. But it is high time in 1957 to see whether this crisis-posture taken some years ago is now the best, and whether it is suited to long-term needs and to global well-being. Some questions once in doubt are now presently or partly answered. The Communists *have* consolidated power in China; they *have not* pushed on with open violence in Korea and in Indochina; they *seem* to be considerably concerned with trade, contacts, status, influence. A number of other countries in Asia, including such major entities as India, Japan, and Indonesia, have felt it possible and desirable to accept the new reality in China without becoming Communist themselves. The progress of nuclear armaments, the Near East crisis, possibly a new fluidity in western and central Europe, require fresh consideration of the international scene.

Hence, we must not be too narrowly bound by easier sets of mind and emotion, or by the fear of statesmen and even of publicists that willingness to think is to be denounced as "soft toward China" and "weak on communism." This writer does not know that there is a right course with probability of good results. But sound policy in a whirling, twisting world of life cannot be found in the rigid projection of a former line, and it will not be discovered by eyes closed to change.

Can constructive thought in Washington, seeking counsel with and from our friends in such places as Tokyo and Manila as well as that pressed from Seoul and Taipei, in such capitals also as Rangoon

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and New Delhi, in Canberra and Ottawa, besides London and Paris, be looking at the great and continuing issue of what should be the relations of the United States and the free world to one-fourth of all mankind? Can voluntary groups of many sorts encourage and protect free inquiry and discussion on these issues which might determine the life or death of civilization as we know it? Can any way be proposed to move forward from the ominous confrontations in Korea and in Vietnam? Can the *de facto* truce in the Strait of Formosa be strengthened? Can the Chinese Communists be enabled to think that an effort by them to be reconciled to the United Nations and to accept the obligations of the Charter might proceed *pari passu* with a mellowing of positions on recognition and on membership in the United Nations?

Such questions do not naïvely assume answers. But these and similar inquiries need to be discussed in creative freedom if we are to escape from a paralysis of policy which leaves us all at the mercy of Communist determination of them and where a dangerous showdown may come, and which leaves Americans exposed to the peril that near-isolation in a UN vote might lead our stalwarts to react with isolationist vehemence. M.S.B.

KASHMIR AND NEHRU

WHILE THE WORLD has been exercised about Hungary and Egypt, the defiance of the United Nations by India on the Kashmir issue went comparatively unobserved. It will be remembered that Kashmir was a disputed territory with predominately Moslem population, which both India and Pakistan claimed. The United Nations ordered a plebiscite and former Senator Frank Graham was appointed the organizer of it. Meanwhile both India and Pakistan refused to move their troops from their respective zones of occupation. Finally Nehru took the law in his own hands and annexed the larger part of Kashmir, which he had already shrewdly integrated into the Indian economy. The Security Council, with only Russia abstaining, unanimously called upon him to obey the United Nations directive, and the Indian government refused to heed the UN.

Several lessons may be drawn from this incident. One is that any nation can defy the United Nations, so long as it is sure that the concert of great powers which offer the effective force of the United Nations do not agree. For if they don't agree, no nation

can be coerced without the danger of precipitating the ultimate war. Nehru had shrewdly calculated on the Russian abstention. It was the *quid pro quo* of his stand on Egypt and his equivocation on Hungary. Secretary Dulles has sought to hide the confusion of our defeat by asserting that India had not yet irrevocably defied the United Nations. This effort to hide the power realities in the issue was about as effective as President Eisenhower's explanation of the difference between Hungary and Egypt. He said the difference consisted of the inclination of Britain and France to obey the law and of Russia to defy it, thus obscuring our furnishing the instruments of coercion for our allies.

Morally the incident puts Nehru in a rather bad light. But his embarrassment, if any, merely proves that, as Goethe observed, "conscience is the virtue of observers and not of agents of action." When India's vital interests were at stake, Nehru forgot lofty sentiments, sacrificed admirers in the *New Statesman and Nation* and subjected himself to the charge of inconsistency.

If we look at the internal politics of the incident we can understand why Nehru was tempted to do this apparently immoral act. Kashmir is a Moslem province and ought to belong to Pakistan. But Pakistan is hardly a viable nation, either politically or economically. Kashmir is also Nehru's birthplace. Whether because of sentiment or out of shrewd calculation, Nehru has integrated Kashmir to India in such a way that its economic advantages from the Indian tie would become very apparent. Furthermore while India is predominantly Hindu in religion it is a secular state offering religious freedom; Pakistan is a religious sacerdotal state after the usual Islamic pattern. For these reasons Nehru thinks that in time both economic advantage and the dissipation of religious fears by religious toleration will outweigh the present weight of Moslem loyalties in the population. Therefore he does not want a plebiscite now but vaguely promises it for the future. This policy is either Machiavellian or statesmanlike, according to your point of view. Our conscience may gag at it but on the other hand those eminently moral men, Prime Minister Gladstone of another day and Secretary Dulles of our day, could offer many parallels of policy for Mr. Nehru, though one may doubt whether either statesman could offer a coherent analysis of the mixture of motives which entered into the policy. That is an achievement beyond the competence of very moral men. R.N.

A Hungarian Answers Hromadka

The following article was written under the pseudonym of George Fogaras by a Hungarian who took part in the revolution. It was sent to us with the strong approval of a scholar who is very familiar with Prof. Josef Hromadka's thought and in whose judgment we have great confidence.

PROFESSOR HROMADKA has recently published an article on the events in Hungary (*Christianity and Crisis*, Jan. 21). In the opening paragraph he explains that he has written the article only because some of his Western friends had asked for his opinion. I think it is very regrettable that he listened to the demand of his friends; rather than write such an article, he should have remained silent, for I am afraid it destroys the picture many churchmen had of Prof. Hromadka. Many people will find it impossible to believe that this article was written by the Hromadka they have known for many years, whom they trusted and whose opinion they often greatly esteemed. In fact, his recent article is nothing else but a repetition of the very questionable phraseology used by Communist newspapers in the East. It is easy to prove it.

To start with, Prof. Hromadka writes that it is very difficult to get a clear picture of the Hungarian events and of the present situation in this country. This was true when the fighting was taking place, but is it difficult now to see quite clearly at least the essential lines? Is it difficult, for instance, to know whether it was a counter-revolution made by a little group of reactionaries, or the movement of the whole population? Is it difficult to know now, after the long, brave strike and the passive resistance of the whole Hungarian working-class? Is it still difficult to tell whether it was a reactionary movement or not, when the whole world knows that the leading Marxist philosopher of our time, George Lukacs, was also involved in the revolution and has been deported together with Imre Nagy and when everybody knows that all the highly esteemed Communist intellectuals played a major part in it?

No, it is not difficult, and it would seem—I am sorry to say—that Prof. Hromadka did not take the time to think it over but simply repeated the phrases he knows so well. I should like to prove here that his article is really nothing else but the repetition of Communist phrases.

(1) Prof. Hromadka says that though the Hungarian events were originated by the righteous demands of the people, Western reactionary forces were present already at the beginning of the revolution, and with the encouragement and help of these forces, it became very soon a counter-revolution. It was not the fight of Hungarians for liberty; the Western powers sent arms to the re-

actionary elements and they made a terrible counter-revolution.

Every Communist article about Hungary begins with this statement, but it is very easy to prove that it is not true. Just ask a Hungarian freedom fighter about the Western arms. Sometimes it would be better not to hear the answer . . . (during the revolution there were very few Hungarians who really wished for Western military aid, but now that everything is over and lost, many people think—in utter despair—that it would have been better if they had received help from the West) . . .

(2) Prof. Hromadka says that the Hungarian fight for freedom was clearly a counter-revolution. I can answer this very simply with two bitter jokes made by the workers after the defeat, when they heard that their movement was called a counter-revolution:

“Report: ‘In the traditionally aristocratic district of Csepel island, the fight is still going on. The whole town is silent, but the aristocrats, capitalists, feudal lords and other reactionary elements of Csepel are still fighting against the troops of the workers, who are kindly supported by our great Russian friends.’ ” (Csepel island is the greatest factory district of Hungary and was always called “red” Csepel.)

In the second, a Hungarian worker says after reading about the counter-revolution:

“I never knew there were in Hungary so many—nine million—aristocrats and reactionaries, and only some thousand workers. Now I really understand why the Russians had to come and support these few good people against nine million wretched counter-revolutionaries.”

(3) According to Prof. Hromadka, even those Hungarians who had some just criticism of communism and really wanted to reform a few things, now approve the Russian intervention of the 4th of November.

During the days of the revolution and the free days which followed, most of the Communists tore their book of membership to pieces and said, “Never again communism.” Nevertheless, some really faithful and earnest Communists said, “Now we shall build up in freedom a new and good, little but strong, Communist Party. But on the morning of the second Russian attack, they also tore to pieces

their book of membership and went to fight on the barricades. . . .

(4) When referring to the revolution, the article often speaks of "nationalism" and "chauvinism." We have to ask: is it chauvinism and nationalism if a country wants to be free, to abolish the red stars from the statues and buildings as the signs of Russian occupation, and use its national emblem instead of the Russian one? Is it nationalism if a country does not want to give all of its resources (uranium, oil, bauxite, etc.) and products to the Russian empire? Further, the Hungarians had not plotted anything against their neighbors (as Prof. Hromadka seems to think). They knew that the neighboring countries were suffering under oppression in the same way. If they felt some resentment, it was because these countries remained silent, and their governments condemned the revolution.

(5) And now comes perhaps the most difficult point. Prof. Hromadka writes:

"The Hungarian land was the scene of horrible counter-revolutionary passion, massacre and pogroms, in which thousands, perhaps tens of thousands perished—not only of Communists, but also Jews and older citizens."

Prof. Hromadka seems to forget that the most horrible things were committed by the wild and merciless Russian troops. Budapest is near to Prague. Why didn't he pay a visit to Budapest before writing the article? He would have seen the terrible ruins in the streets, the bombed hospitals, etc., and the tens of thousands of slaughtered civilians, men and women, boys and girls, old people and children lying still unburied in the courtyards of the cemeteries in the beginning of December. All this seems to be without any importance because it was made by the Russians, whose actions are on principle almost always right for him.

Apart from this, it is true that some regrettable events took place in the revolution itself, but Prof. Hromadka greatly exaggerates. . . . The people killed by the mob were almost all members of the secret police. Prof. Hromadka, who lives in a Communist country, can understand (not justify!) the hatred against these people. It is true that some Communists were killed in rural areas during the days of fighting and uncertainty, but no one could have stopped the outbreak of anger against some especially cruel Communists which had accumulated during twelve years of oppression. It is a miracle that so few regrettable and cruel events happened. There was no other revolution in world

history which was so relatively clean in its morals. Prof. Hromadka knows well and appreciates very much the great "October Revolution of 1917." One has only to compare the two to see at once that a Communist has no right to condemn the Hungarian revolution for its "white terror" and cruelty. Of course from a Christian standpoint, it is very sad and regrettable that cruelties happened at all; even if they were just few, they can never be justified by earthly reasoning. Some demonic power manifested itself in the Hungarian revolution too, as the devil is always present in every human action. The question rather is: should a Christian condemn the revolution, as a matter of principle? . . . The revolution was inevitable and one cannot now condemn the whole because of some really terrible and regrettable, but peripheral, events. . . .

It is very important to note that the leaders, the freedom fighters and the greatest part of the population were strongly opposed to any kind of terror and cruelty, and in the days of victory and freedom they did everything to prevent it. Hungary had only three days of freedom, three days to make order, but on the third day there was almost complete order in the country. There were no separate, regional governments, no people who bore arms without a license, and so on. People said: "Freedom is a precious jewel, we don't want to lose it, and to keep freedom we have to keep order." Prof. Hromadka is not right when he says that the Russian intervention on the 4th of November saved Hungary from complete disintegration. On the contrary, it was their first, as well as second interventions which created complete disorder and chaos.

(6) Now let us consider the charge of anti-Semitism. We must confess that there is a certain degree of anti-Semitism in the satellite states. But why? Chiefly because many of the Communist leaders were Jews. Especially in Hungary almost all of the great Communist leaders—probably with the exception of Imre Nagy and Kadar—were Jews. To mention only a few: Rakosi, Gerö, Hegedus, Revai. Unfortunately, and we cannot say how sorry we are for that, many people identified the Jews with communism. But in spite of this, at least in Budapest in the center of the revolution, one could not hear a single anti-Semitic voice. Maybe some Jews were persecuted (especially in the country where organization took more time)—though not because they were Jews, but because they were members of the secret police, the AVO. On the other hand, it is well known that many Jews helped to organize the revolution after it started and took a great part in the spiritual movements (for example, the Petöfi

club) which prepared the way for the revolution. There are many . . . who are now imprisoned because of having taken part in the fight for freedom . . .

(7) Prof. Hromadka says that émigrés were organizing and helping the revolution and giving it the character of a counter-revolution. Maybe some émigrés returned to Hungary in the first days of confusion, but they had no part in the fight for freedom. The freedom fighters were very careful not to mix with them. The Hungarians felt a certain bitterness against those who left Hungary during the previous years. They said: "We suffered during all these years, we want to fight for the freedom we want to enjoy, and we want to determine our future alone. We do not need those who left us in the most difficult years." . . .

(8) I must deal with the attack of Prof. Hromadka against the Western anti-Communist and anti-Soviet propaganda. In some aspects he is right, but he seems to forget entirely the anti-Western Communist propaganda. He would have the right to speak only if he spoke at least as hard against the Communist propaganda.

Professor Hromadka wonders why the Western world is still suspicious of the East. We have to ask him, is there any reason to relinquish this suspicion, especially now that Soviet imperialism has shown quite clearly its true, cruel face—not only in Hungary but in the other satellite states too? . . . And after these facts, the Western world should change its opinion? Perhaps it would have changed it if the former policy of "peaceful coexistence" had been continued. But it was stopped. Can the West once more believe the Kremlin after the tragicomic developments since the famous Twentieth Congress? . . . The same people, especially Khrushchev, who a year ago condemned Stalin now praise him. This is all a little bit hard for a man in the West to understand, and does not induce him to give up his suspicions.

There is one more very important point. Prof. Hromadka writes:

"Whether the Western world and its churches realize it or not, their joy over the Hungarian uprising and their anger over the change on November 4, 1956, grow far more from anti-Soviet sentiments than from an interest in the liberty of the Hungarian nation."

It is true that there is a deep antipathy in the West against the Soviets, but in its greater part it was caused by the cruelty of the Russians in Hungary, or at least the Hungarian events did by

no means weaken the antipathy. The Hungarians must tell, because they experienced it in several ways, of the deep and true interest the Western world had in their fight for freedom and how much the West was shocked when it learned about its suppression. Perhaps Prof. Hromadka, living in a Communist country, is no longer able to realize what a shock it is for Western people to see the denial of the most simple, and in the West quite natural, human rights. The Hungarians would surely deny the accusation of Prof. Hromadka, that the present Western anti-Soviet wave and the deep sympathy expressed in deeds rose only out of a pre-existing and questionable antipathy, rather than out of the solidarity of the West with a people who wanted nothing else but freedom, independence and neutrality. Everybody who enjoys freedom is deeply moved by its oppression.

(9) It is only natural that Prof. Hromadka cannot take a different line when speaking of the church. He is strongly opposed to the statement of the World Council of Churches which considers the events that took place in the Hungarian Protestant churches during the revolution as the opening of a new "great day." . . .

It was a great day because of the changes in the leadership. Prof. Hromadka admits that not everything had been in order in the churches, but he thinks that the change of bishops alone does not secure the freedom of the church. In normal conditions it really does not, but Prof. Hromadka knows quite well how much depends on bishops in a Communist regime. If the congregations are allowed to elect those whom they trust, that means a good deal of freedom. Apart from this he does not seem to know the situation and the events . . . I cannot help suspecting that, in order to be able to write such an article, he did not want to see it clearly.

After the revolution was won, a general appeal was made that all the leaders of the Reformed and Lutheran Churches should resign. It was stated that as soon as possible there would be new elections and, if the congregations wanted it, all the bishops and seniors could be re-elected. But the resignations had to be made because most of them had been appointed forcibly, without the trust and will of the congregations. Prof. Hromadka should know that most of those who had time resigned, and that some even did so before the appeal; he should have read their letters of resignation. The Hungarian refugee ministers and students report that the bishops and seniors all confessed that they could not lead the church in the right way and felt that

they had to retire. It was also decided that until the new elections, substitutes should lead the church. There was only one exception, the case of Bishop Ravasz. Some years ago he was forced to resign, and his successor had been appointed as bishop against the will of the church (there are documents which prove it). So according to the law, Bishop Ravasz was still the bishop, and the church needed somebody to be a leader in those very difficult days. Bishop Ravasz did not want to accept, but after a long discussion he declared himself ready to serve the church for a very short time, until the possibility of new elections.

In spite of the opinion of Prof. Hromadka, the rehabilitation of Bishop Ravasz did not mean restoration. The Bishop made it quite clear in his message on the radio that Hungary had two great enemies: restoration and anarchy. He made that so clear, not only on the wireless but in an article, in all of the discussions and in his sermons too that, so far as I know, not even the present government has accused him of working for restoration. Let me note here that the Communist government often had more understanding for the church and its life (and probably even more so now) than some of the Eastern church leaders.

Further, the victory of the revolution was a great day for the churches because they were given a possibility to renew all the missionary activities which had been prohibited. The great change is this: until the revolution, the churches could deal practically only with those people who came to the church. Now it can go out to them and call them. Mission work is the essential function of the church. It is therefore hard to understand why Prof. Hromadka does not like the opening of new ways of service for churches which—as he says—are near to his heart. We hope that the Communist government will have more understanding for the churches than Prof. Hromadka has and will not force these former leaders on the church and will recognize certain rights of the churches. We have a slight ground for that hope.

After all this there remains a very important question, namely, why did Prof. Hromadka write this article and why did he write it in such a way? It would be a very simple answer to say, only because he wanted to show his faithfulness towards the Communist world, or wanted to strengthen his position at home. I must confess that the way he writes points to a certain degree to this answer. But we have to go further. Could it be that he is so naïve as to believe all that he has written? I would be happy to accept this solution. But there

are newspapers and radios; some facts are known in the whole world. It is impossible that he does not know them. He must for example, know that it was not a counter-revolution which took place in Hungary. He could have known this if he had thought only of his friends involved in the movement. If he lived far away from Hungary, let us say in India, I could imagine that he might not know the situation. But he lives next to Hungary, and even in India people know a good deal about the truth.

Perhaps we can find a little hint in his article as to where we should look for the answer. He speaks about the new socialistic conception of freedom and later he condemns the abstract conception of freedom and democracy. Let us compare the Christian and Communist conceptions of freedom and we shall see at once the great danger in which a Christian theologian finds himself if he wants to accept both. The Christians believe that the real freedom is to recognize the will of God and willingly to obey it after having known it. According to Marxism, real freedom is to recognize the necessary laws of social development and to obey them willingly. If somebody identifies the Christian conception of freedom with acceptance of the laws of social development as defined by Marxism, he can easily condemn the Hungarian revolution because it was clearly against the Communist laws of development. The revolution sought freedom for the people to choose their own leaders instead of being ruled solely by Communists; it wanted freedom for the whole population to choose their own form of government instead of the Communist dictatorship; it wanted neutrality for the country instead of being part of the Eastern Communist bloc, etc.

Although I should like to, I cannot find any other answer to the question of why Prof. Hromadka wrote this particular article. And I must say that I regret very much being rather harsh sometimes in this answer, but it is always necessary to tell—without any diplomacy—that which I think to be the truth. I still hope that Prof. Hromadka will some time change his mind.

In Our Next Issue

ERNEST GROSS writes on "How We Can Help the UN Survive."

"Diplomacy is the science of navigating a set course. When the way is dark and the going gets rough, sea-room is essential to navigation. Similarly, we are finding that a prime value of the United Nations is the space it offers in which clashing and complex interests can maneuver."

CORRESPONDENCE

Foreign Policy Discussion

TO THE EDITORS: Dr. Thompson's analysis of the crisis in Europe and the American dilemma (issue of January 7) was most illuminating. However, his suggestion that the United States "might have firmly and deliberately disassociated" itself from the intervention of Britain and France in the Suez crisis without taking a leading part in the UN repudiation of that action seems to me to be politically naïve. At that point in the development of the international situation any such "neutralism" on our part would have constituted the most awkward kind of fence-straddling and would certainly have been exploited by Russia and the Arab bloc to the further detriment of the West.

It remains to be seen whether in the long run the West has been weakened or strengthened by the recent breach in the unity of its Middle East policy. It must now be obvious to all that our allies are not mere satellites. This means that within the Western alliance there is real freedom. This freedom constitutes a great peril to the Western alliance, but at the same time it gives this alliance of sovereign states the kind of flexibility it must have in order to be viable. The Soviet orbit lacks just such flexibility, and in the long run we find in this lack the Achilles heel of the Russian armor.

William Farmer
Drew University
Madison, New Jersey

TO THE EDITORS: Surely Dr. Thompson's letter proves that he is a thorough analyst, but it ignores the fact that the colonial means resorted to by Britain and France were the best invitation for communism. The Middle East countries constitute 50% of the problem and as important forces against communism they are equal with other parts of the world.

Perhaps in the passion of opposing communistic infiltration and Russian maneuvers we forget the objective behind this fight, namely, the ambition for peace and freedom for all people. If a decisive policy is required of the State, it should lie behind this principle.

I find Dr. Bennett's comment just and impartial.

A. Hanna, M. D.
New York, N. Y.

The writer of the following letter visited Egypt in December in connection with his work as director of the Church World Service program in Asia and other non-European areas.

TO THE EDITORS: Dr. Thompson deplores the empty moralism and the righteous legalism that have in recent years characterized many of our government's pronouncements and actions. Alas, many of us know the indictment to be true even without the benefit of European comment. But must it ever be so? Was it not a hopeful and reassuring moment when, in the Egyptian crisis, our President and his advisors did rise up to oppose the Israeli-British-French aggression, and so bring to their

moral utterances a confirmation in deed? Is the "path of honor" forever closed because we have not always walked it in the past? That America found itself voting with Russia on the UN resolution, and that the Western alliance was divided followed upon our action not because America willed it so, but because France and Britain entered upon a course that the nations of the world could, in good conscience, only oppose. The supreme hypocrisy would have been for us to condemn tank warfare in Budapest and to condone it in Port Said. And let there be no doubt, the destruction in Port Said and the flight of refugees into the Nile Delta are not facts we can ignore.

. . . Dr. Thompson speaks of "the realities of strategy and vital interests." Here again, the resort to force proved unwise and self-defeating. One grows uneasy to see the increasing body of opinion that speaks of the attack on Egypt not so much in terms of its fundamental unjustness, but rather of its bad timing and poor execution . . .

Are we *really* to believe that in November of 1956, Britain, France and Israel had only to overthrow Col. Nasser, to force Egypt to her knees, and to station paratroopers alongside the Suez Canal in order to secure the vital interests of the area! I should think at this stage in history it would be self-evident that access to oil and passage along strategic waterways are not to be purchased with occupation currency, but with the coin of friendship, understanding and constructive help.

In my opinion, Dr. Thompson is mistaken in thinking that Dr. Bennett's questions require another article on a different topic, in suggesting that "an essay on Europe's crisis ought to deal more with European than Asian problems." It is precisely as we view the world scene, as we contemplate events in Algeria, in Egypt, at almost any point in Asia, that we find eloquent evidence of Europe's crisis and see how this *must* be viewed in the light of Asia's problems. The millions in Asia and Africa are no less anxious than we in the West to secure food, land, security, and freedom . . . and in our search for answers, surely we can agree that the well-being of Asia and Africa is equal in importance to our own.

Russell Stevenson
New York, N. Y.

The following two comments are excerpts from letters to Kenneth Thompson.

"I find myself in general accord with your conclusions. I am not sure I would put American preoccupation with moral values in international relations quite so positively as you do. And I would venture to add the point that no government recalculates its power position until it gets into real trouble. In this respect, it seems to me, Europe and America are pretty much alike. The failure of perception and thinking to keep abreast of rapidly moving events is a well-known, but perhaps insufficiently studied, phenomenon of foreign policy. At moments of crisis and catastrophe, governments and private individuals often give a good deal of attention to the properties of the international en-

vironment. Then, when conditions settle down, the conclusions reached in time of previous stress become hardened into dogmas which provide expectations for the future, long after events have eroded the base upon which such expectations rest. This continues until the discrepancy between the environment-as-perceived and environment-as-is grows wide enough to precipitate another period of stress and crisis; and then the cycle starts over again. This, of course, is much oversimplified; but it constitutes in effect a sort of working hypothesis . . ."

Harold Sprout
Prof. of International Relations
Princeton University

"Of all the comment I have read on the related Middle East and Hungarian crisis, I have seen no more admirable statement. Though the Eisenhower Doctrine seems to point in the right direction, I must say I have some real qualms. Do we have the forces with which to intervene effectively on some basis other than massive retaliation? And doesn't the invitational aspect of our intervention bespeak the bankruptcy in the political-moral thinking of the Administration? If we have vital interests to defend in the Middle East against Soviet encroachment then we had better not decline to defend them for lack of an invitation to do so. And if we have no such vital interest, how can we justify intervention no matter how warm the invitation, except on the basis of pure moral abstraction once again?"

E. Raymond Platig
Prof. of Political Science
University of Denver

Hromadka and Hungary

TO THE EDITORS: You are to be congratulated for publishing Professor Hromadka's article (issue of Jan. 21), but I was deeply disappointed by Professor Bennett's complete rejection of it. No doubt Hromadka has his blind spots as we all do, and it is well to point out his failure to indicate in his article any "positive significance in the stirrings in Poland and Hungary"; but your dismissal of the article with the statement that "it is hard to see how [we] can again take seriously what he says" invites your readers to overlook much that may be true and ought to be taken seriously. I wonder if

your editorial has not revealed a very serious blind spot of your own . . .

It seems to me that the article makes two important points. The first is that we are showing ourselves . . . hopelessly suspicious of everything the Russians do . . . What hope is there for the world if every Communist overture is regarded by our political leaders and editorial writers (even by you) as a weapon directed against us? . . . With Hromadka, we have a Christian on the other side of the Iron Curtain pleading, with at least *personal* sincerity, for more understanding and trust, and you reject his appeal!

The other main point that I saw in Hromadka's article should also be heeded, namely, that it is wrong for us to rejoice over Russian problems and to try to stir up trouble behind the Iron Curtain unless we have good reason for believing that events are carrying men closer to the Kingdom of God. I suspect there may be some truth in Hromadka's suggestion that American commentators err very seriously in thinking that the Hungarian masses revolted because of a rejection of communism and a desire for freedom as we understand it in our country . . . I believe Hromadka is right in suggesting that the spirit of fascism is not dead. Surely the Roman Church is working for the restoration of the old order in Hungary. And I also suspect that Hromadka is right in charging that most of us are far more interested in a Soviet defeat than in securing liberty and justice for peoples like the Hungarians . . .

We should welcome an article like Hromadka's, though not uncritically of course, as a contribution to international understanding . . . I cannot agree with Dr. Bennett that it would have been better for him to have remained silent.

The Rev. Langford Baldwin
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